When thinking about wrong-doing and its remedies, we traditionally tend to try to keep things simple by framing the issue in insistently bi-lateral terms.
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Things are not so simple in trilateral cases, where there is also an innocent beneficiary of the wrong-doing. That innocent beneficiary is, let us suppose, wholly innocent and not involved in any way in the wrong-doing itself. The innocent beneficiary is merely wrongly enriched through the wrong-doing.
Two questions arise in such cases. First, what ought the innocent beneficiaries do, when they realize that they have benefitted from wrongdoing? Second, what ought victims receive by way of compensation for the wrongs done to them? We will argue that, insofar as is still possible:
• innocent beneficiaries of wrong-doing should relinquish benefits which they wrongly received;
• those relinquished benefits should be used to compensate victims of the wrong-doing; but the innocent beneficiary has no special responsibility for paying the victim's costs over and above relinquishing in her favour the benefit he has received in consequence of the wrong-doing, and some other mechanism should be found for the victims to be compensated for the rest of their losses.
Furthermore, we will argue that each of those propositions has moral importance in its own right. The rightness of disgorging wrongfully held benefits is not wholly derivative from the wrongness of victims going uncompensated.
I.
Of course it's wrong to commit a wrong. Of course it's wrong to conspire, ii Let us begin by bracketing out two easy ways of answering those questions. First, 'benefiting from wrong-doing' sounds awfully like being a 'receiver of stolen goods'. Pursuing that thought, we might be tempted to assimilate the person benefiting from another's wrong-doing to an 'accessary after the fact'. As defined by Blackstone, that is someone who, 'knowing a felony to have been committed, receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the felon'.
iii And just as one can be an accessary to a wrong-doing legally, so too presumably can one be an accessary morally.
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The main point to note about accessaries is simply this. Being an accessary to a murder makes you a party to the murder. To quote Blackstone again, 'An accessory is he who is not the chief actor in the offense, nor present at its performance, but' -and this is the point we wish to emphasize here -'is someway concerned therein.' v To be an accessary, even an accessary after the fact, to another person's wrong-doing is to contribute to and take part in it.
And being involved in that way in the wrong itself is precisely one of the things that we want to bracket out here, in order to focus on the significance of benefiting from wrong-doing as such.
A second easy way of answering the question would be to assimilate benefiting from wrong-doing to cases requiring 'restitution' in some straightforward sense. Restitution often refers to the duty to return goods that have been delivered to you in error. In cases like that, no one committed any wrong against anyone. The driver of the delivery truck simply made an honest mistake. Your neighbour's '1' just looked awfully like a '7' on the order 4 form, so that's where the driver left the case of wine that your neighbour had ordered. In those circumstances, you in number 7 are under a clear obligation (legally, and surely morally as well) to restore the goods to their rightful owner.
The sorts of cases upon which we want to focus here, however, are different from that in two important respects. First, they involve a wrong rather than merely an innocent error. vi Second, in the cases we will be discussing, there is no discrete, tangible 'thing' to be returned.
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The fact that it was a wrong rather than an innocent error surely heightens the duty of the beneficiary to relinquish the benefits he wrongly received, and at the same time heightens the claim of the victim to compensation for her wrongful losses. Indeed, the fact that it was a wrong rather than an innocent error heightens the duty of the beneficiary to relinquish the benefits that wrongly enrich him, even if doing so is not strictly necessary to compensate the victim.
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Note that not all benefits that are causally downstream of wrong-doing can be properly treated as fruits of that wrong-doing and be required to be disgorged for that reason. Someone has flown a plane into a building; you go into a bar to get out of the smoke, strike up a conversation with someone who becomes your business partner, and you go on to make your fortune. The fortune is causally downstream of the wrong of crashing the plane into the building: you would not have gone into the bar otherwise. But the benefits you received are incidental rather than essential to the wrongs on which they counterfactually depend. What was wrongly taken from the victims has not passed, directly or indirectly, to you. ix 5
II.
A.
For what will serve as our running example, suppose your father had bribed In the case as just specified, the beneficiary of the injustice knows (1) precisely who was the victim of the injustice and (2) But suppose there is no way of telling the order in which you ten were wrongly admitted, and hence no way of telling exactly which person on the waitlist was wrongly deprived of a place by each of your wrongful admissions.
In one way, the proper response to that situation is clear. Whatever we think the one beneficiary should do for the one victim by way of recompense, the ten should do for the ten. You do not know exactly which one of the ten victims was denied a place because of your own wrongful admission, of course; but you know one of them was. The same is true of all the other of your classmates whose admission was due to a bribe. There is -as an unknowable fact of the matter, but a fact of the matter nonetheless -a one-toone link between each of the beneficiaries of the wrong and one of the victims 7 of the wrong, and between each of the victims and one of the beneficiaries.
At the aggregate level, you know that the ten victims were all excluded because, and only because, the ten beneficiaries of the wrong-doing were all included.
In such circumstances, you can simply pool whatever recompense is due from each of you beneficiaries of the wrong-doing, and transfer that to a fund to be distributed somehow among all of the victims. How exactly that fund should then be dispersed among victims is a tricky question: maybe the division should be equal, maybe it should be skewed toward those among the victims who are worse off. That is the difficulty (and it is obviously a difficulty with principled aspects as well as purely practical ones) that arises from the absence of a knowable one-to-one relationship between the person benefiting from the wrong and the person suffering from it. But the awkwardness is at least confined to that aspect of the matter alone.
C.
Those first two cases involved one-to-one or ten-to-ten relationships. More surprisingly, perhaps, that 'disgorge the ill-gotten gains' response remains appealing even when the uncertainties run in the direction opposite to the way that they do in the previous case. So for a third variation on the Harvard admission case, suppose that (incredibly enough) there was only one individual refused admission that year and there were ten people whose admission was wrongly secured through bribes. Had any of those ten not been wrongly admitted, the one person would have been (and had no bribe been paid, Harvard's class would have just been nine smaller that year).
Surely it seems right to say that each of the ten should relinquish (insofar as possible) the benefits of the wrongs committed on his behalf, even though there is only one person to compensate. After all, each is in possession of something that wrongly enrich him. Surely it should not be cheaper or in any other way more permissible to do wrong (or benefit from a wrong-doing, either), just because more other people are doing (or benefiting from) wrongs with whom you can split the costs. xx Neither, presumably, should it be any more permissible to keep a larger part of your (inadvertent) gains from the wrongs of others, just because more other people have also benefited (also inadvertently) from similar wrongs.
III.
Even innocent beneficiaries of wrong-doing should therefore disgorge what they have wrongly received. They have committed no wrong themselves, to be sure. Nonetheless, they have what they have as a result of a wrong. They are wrongly enriched, and it would be wrong for them to keep those riches.
Next let us consider various questions concerning 'how much' they should disgorge.
In cases of restitution, it is simple: the person who has wrongly received some particular good should give it back to the rightful owner. But where, as with the Harvard education, there is no tangible thing that can be given back -or where it can no longer be given back -'giving back' must take some different form. And how to calculate 'how much' then becomes a live issue.
What they should give back in those circumstances is, we suggest, the cash equivalent of the subjective value of the thing they received. xxi That is the quantum of the beneficiary's benefit, after all. xxii There may be all sorts of pragmatic difficulties (to do with honest revelation, and so on) in employing this 'subjective benefit' standard directly as the social rule; pragmatically we might opt for some other rule instead. But surely in principle that is the right rule, which fact ought to inform any practical rules we adopt.
B.
There may be some conditions under which the innocent beneficiary should not have to give back all of the benefits that he has received. Here are two reasons.
The first concerns uncertainty. is an open question, and one that will presumably at least sometimes be decided in favour of keeping rather than relinquishing such benefits.
Similar issues arise in law with 'good faith purchasers' of tangible goods.
You bought a stolen car in all good faith. The asking price was not ridiculously low; you had no reason to suppose that the title certificate was forged and the car was actually stolen. The treatment of good-faith purchasers in the law varies across jurisdictions. xxvi But at least sometimes law says that we should leave the good-faith purchaser in possession of the goods. One reason to hesitate to require good-faith purchasers to return the goods to the original owner is that those goods are by now intertwined with their own plans and projects which returning the goods would therefore disrupt, imposing costs on them that may well exceed the benefits they derived from the goods. Were we confident that the benefits received instead exceeded the costs to them of returning the goods, however, we would no longer have any such hesitation.
In the law of 'unjust enrichment', too, someone who receives a mistaken payment is unjustly enriched and is held strictly liable to return the monies, once s/he becomes aware of the mistake. But those who are unaware that they have been unjustly enriched and innocently rely to their detriment upon 14 the validity of the enrichment in ways that would make them very badly off were they now to return the payment can employ the defense of 'change of position' in common law to reduce or altogether eliminate their liability. for limiting the amount that he is required to pay. We do not deny the importance of considerations of cost in reckoning how much, exactly, is due from innocent beneficiaries. All we insist upon is that they should be seen merely as excusing conditions or as pleas in mitigation, reducing the magnitude of (or in the extreme case overriding) the claims of victims. How often or strongly those excuses or pleas in mitigation apply is an open question. Maybe, at least in certain classes of cases, they are common and strong. Our concern here is not to argue one way or another on that score.
Our concern here is instead merely to establish the firm presumption that innocent beneficiaries are under a duty to disgorge benefits that are wrongfully in their possession. Regardless of how frequently or infrequently that presumption is overridden, that wrongful benefits ought to be disgorged should always be the presumption.
IV.
So far we have concentrated on the beneficiary side of the equation, focusing on the innocent beneficiary's duty to disgorge benefits. Let us shift now to the victim side of the equation, and the claim of victims for recompense of those wrongs. In our discussion up to this point, that has appeared to be a simple and subsidiary issue. But that appearance derives from a special feature of all the cases presented so far. In all those cases, fully disgorging the benefits would yield enough fully to recompense the victims. Next we need to consider what to do when it will not.
Here is yet another variation on the Harvard admission example, along those lines. As in the very first version, suppose we know exactly which anything to deserve to bear that burden. The victim did nothing wrong.
Neither did the innocent beneficiary of someone else's wrong-doing (once he has relinquished the benefits that came his way through that wrongdoing xxviii ). But even though neither deserves to suffer the loss, someone has to (or it has somehow to be divided among them and/or other people: we shall return to this shortly). Who should that be?
Of course if the wrong-doer himself is still around, then he is clearly the person with primary responsibility for compensating his victim and making him whole. But we assume, for the purposes of discussion, that the wrongdoer is unavailable to play this role. Anyone who is complicit in or has contributed to the wrong-doing in some other way would bear secondary responsibility for righting the wrong. xxix But again, for the purpose of this example, we assume that there are no such people to play this role. Other considerations might argue in favour of requiring the innocent beneficiary compensate the victim for his losses fully, over and above merely disgorging the benefits that wrongly enrich him. Some might suppose that a case for doing so might be couched in terms of how closely the beneficiary of the wrong is connected to the wrong-doing. Of course, ex hypothesi, the innocent beneficiary was not himself directly implicated in the wrong-doing.
Still, he might be more-or-less closely connected to it, in other ways. Or so the thought might go (to foreshadow, our conclusion will be that this initially tempting thought does not stand up to closer examination).
The beneficiary might appear to be connected dangerously closely to the wrong-doing, for example, if he were the 'direct, intended beneficiary' of the We conclude that whether the innocent beneficiary was the directed intended beneficiary of the wrong-doing makes no difference to his duties in the matter. Those who are not the direct intended beneficiaries of wrongdoing have no more (and no less) duty to disgorge the benefits that they wrongly received. Those who are the direct intended beneficiaries of the wrong-doing have no more duty to do more toward compensating the victim than simply disgorging the benefits that they wrong received.
So to answer the first of the questions posed at the beginning of the paper ('Is it wrong to benefit from wrong-doing?') our answer would be: 'No, you have done nothing wrong, and the wrong done by the other in no way transmits to you through your the receipt of the benefits.' But to the second question ('Does anything else morally follow?') our answer would be: 'Yes, you must disgorge the benefits as soon as practicable after you discover they were the consequence of wrong-doing.' (And we should add: 'You also ought to take all reasonable measures to discover whether or not they were the consequence of wrong-doing, and if so to whom.') While the innocent beneficiaries of wrong-doing have done no wrong, they will of course have done wrong should they fail to disgorge the benefits they have wrongly received. It is not that innocent beneficiaries of wrongdoing owe more than anyone else to the wronged party, as a general matter.
It is merely that the wronged person has an enforceable claim to the gains that the beneficiary possesses, and he has no comparable claims against others. There is, however, a further option. If the beneficiary's disgorging does not fully compensate the victim, then maybe the further costs of doing so should be spread across the general public, rather than being taken out of the hide of either the innocent beneficiary or the innocent victim of wrong-doing.
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Of course the public does not 'deserve' to bear the burden any more than either the beneficiary or the victim. xxxiv No one does, in the scenario as described.
Why might we think the public ought be the one to bear the burden?
Well, spreading the burden among the larger group of people that constitutes 'the public' makes the cost to each member of the public smaller, and hence more affordable (if done through taxes that are themselves equitable, anyway), than if either the beneficiary or the victim alone or in some combination were required to bear it.
It is easy to see how such a principle could also be defended on contractualist grounds. Ex ante, it would seem rational the people would choose to run an increased risk of having to bear a very small cost in order to fund schemes that compensate victims of wrong-doing. In that way, they could diminish the risks that, through no fault of their own, they might end up bearing very significant costs, either because they are the direct victims of wrong-doing or innocent beneficiaries who must compensate others for wrongs done to them.
V.
At the outset we posed a third question: whether it was worse to enjoy undeserved benefits obtained through wrong-doing (albeit not one's own wrong-doing) than it is to enjoy undeserved benefits by mere innocent error.
We are now in a position to see just how different cases of benefitting from wrong-doing are from benefiting from innocent error, on both the beneficiary and victim sides of the ledger.
On the beneficiary side, we would be much less insistent that the beneficiary relinquish a benefit he acquired through innocent error. Suppose your admission to Harvard came not through your father's bribing the admissions official but instead through a sheer clerical error in the Admissions Office. In some sense, it was still wrong that you were admitted to Harvard (your test scores just didn't merit admission). But it was not the result of any wrong-doing.
In that case we might be relatively more relaxed about allowing you to retain the benefits of that error in your favour. Certainly, at the very least, we would not be remotely tempted to insist that you should those disgorge benefits in cases where no one has been made worse off by the error, where the benefits were obtained through innocent error rather than as the product of wrong-doing, even a wrong-doing not your own.
On the victim side, too, we are much less insistent that the victim be compensated for his losses when they come about through blameless accident or innocent error than when they come about as a result of intentional wrongdoing. In the classic case of bi-lateral wrong-doing, we think that the wrongdoer himself should do whatever it takes to make the victim whole, even if that leaves the wrong-doer himself seriously out of pocket. Where the wrongdoer himself has now disappeared from the scene, we think that the innocent beneficiaries of their wrong-doing should at least disgorge all the benefits they thus received in favour of the victim of that wrong-doing; and where that still is not enough to compensate the victim, we ordinarily think arrangements should be made to complete the task of compensating victims (section IV above).
But what seems crucial to that response is the fact that the victim's losses came as a result of his being wronged, somehow. When instead the victim's losses come as the result of blameless accident or innocent error, we are much more prepared to let the losses lie where they fall. As evidence of that, just notice the fact that there is a publicly-organized system of Criminal Injuries
Compensation in a great many jurisdictions, but there is one of Accident
Compensation only (so far as we are aware) in New Zealand.
VI.
There is that the more time that has passed and the more that has happened since the original wrong-doing, the more those subsequent factors are likely to be responsible for the current state of affairs and the less the relative contribution of the original wrong-doing to that state of affairs will be. 
